Bedard and Musser v. City of Boise City Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 44171 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-21-2016
Bedard and Musser v. City of Boise City Appellant's
Brief Dckt. 44171
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Bedard and Musser v. City of Boise City Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44171" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6432.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6432
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
BEDARD and MUSSER, an Idaho 
partnership, and BOISE HOLLOW LAND 




CITY OF BOISE CITY, a body politic 
corporate of the State of Idaho, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Docket No. 44171-2016 
Ada County No. CV-2015-10297 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District for the County of Ada 
Honorable Jonathan Medema, District Judge, Presiding 
Terry C. Copple, Esq. 
Michael E. Band, Esq. 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP 
P.O. Box 1583 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys.for Plaint[ffs-Appellants 
Scott B. Muir, Esq. 
Abigail R. Germaine, Esq. 
Deputy City Attorneys 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
PY 
OCT 2 1 20\6 
STATEMENT OF 
A. Nature of the 
B. Relevant Procedural History 
C. Statement of 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ANALYSIS 
A. Tee effectively conveyed a permanent easement to 
Vancroft because [l] Vancroft, as fee title owner Lot 1, 
consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and 
[2] V ancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and 
title with respect to Lot 1 and Lot 4. The permanent 
easement was not subsequently extinguished by the 
termination of the lease because at no point has there been 
concurrence of the common law unities. 
B. The City should be estopped from denying the existence of 
the easement because when it accepted the Deed of Gift it 
assumed and became bound to the known obligations and 
duties appurtenant to Lot 1, including the easement and the 
Permanent Easement Agreement 
C. The plain language of the Permanent Easement Agreement 
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Nature of the Case 
The parties to case are successors-in-interest to 1 1 
which purported to grant an access easement across land1 
now owned by Defendant-Respondent City of Boise (the "City") to an adjacent 63-acre parce12 
owned by Plaintiff-Appellant Boise Hollow Land Holdings, RLLP ("Boise Hollow"). This case 
concerns the interpretation of the Permanent Easement Agreement. 
It is Boise Hollow' s position that the plain language of the Permanent Easement 
Agreement permits Boise Hollow to expand the easement area to such dimensions as are 
necessary to comply with the requirements of the Ada County Highway District (ACHD) and 
then dedicate the easement road to ACHD as a public road. 
The City contends that the Permanent Easement Agreement does not call for the 
expansion of the easement area. Accordingly, Boise Hollow sought a declaration from the 
District Court that, under the Permanent Easement Agreement, the easement road may be 
expanded in order to meet ACHD's requirements. 
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the IDAHO RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE (I.R.C.P.). District Judge Jonathan Medema determined that the Permanent 
Easement Agreement did not successfully convey a permanent easement to Boise Hollow's 
1 Lot I, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
2 Lot 4, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
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now appeals Medema's decision. 
B. Relevant Procedural History 
The following District Court proceedings are pertinent to his appeal: 
1. Pleadings and Parties 
Plaintiff Bedard and Musser filed its COMPLAINT FOR QUIET TITLE (R. 000007-000051) 3 
on June 17, 2015. The City filed its ANSWER TO COMPLAINT (R. 000052-000057) on July 8, 
2015. 
Subsequently, Bedard and Musser assigned its interest in the 63-acre parcel and the 
Permanent Easement Agreement to Boise Hollow. See R. 000105-000107. On December 2, 
2016, it was ordered that Boise Hollow be joined as an additional party plaintiff to this matter. 
See R. 000058-000059. The parties stipulated to the filing by Plaintiffs of the FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, which recites and incorporates Boise Hollow's 
interest into the factual allegations and prayer for relief. 
The FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 000060-000107) was filed on December 2, 2015. 
The City's ANSWER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 000223-000228) was filed on December 
14, 2015. 
3 The Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited herein as "R." The Reporter's Transcript on Appeal is cited as "Tr." The 
exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as "Ex." 
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Boise 
Boise Hollow's Motion 
Opposition 




IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 000198-000222); [2] AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA 
w. ARNOLD ("Arnold Aff," R. 000134-000171); [3] AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN McCARTHY, P.E. (R. 
000109-133); and [4] AFFIDAVIT OF DEAN w. BRIGGS, P.E. ("Briggs Aff.," R. 000172-000197). 
On January 15, 2016, the City filed the following in direct opposition to Boise Hollow's 
Motion: [l] DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (R. 000375-000397); and [2] SECOND DECLARATION OF COUNSEL ABIGAIL R. 
GERMAINE (R. 000398-000404). 
On February 2016, Boise Hollow filed its 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 000405-000420). 
IN SUPPORT OF 
The Court heard oral argument on this motion on February 16, 2016. 
MOTION 
ii. The City's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and Boise Hollow's 
Opposition 
The City filed DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R.000229-
000230) on December 31, 2015. Concurrently, the City filed: [I] MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R. 000231-000251); [2] DECLARATION 
OF TOMMY T. SANDERSON (R. 000352-000369).; and [3] DECLARATION OF COUNSEL ABIGAIL R. 




On February 9, 2016, 
OF 
OF TOMMY ("Second Sanderson 
City filed the following further support of DEFENDANT'S 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: [l] REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (R 000523-000536); and [2] THIRD DECLARATION OF 
COUNSEL ABIGAIL R GERMAINE (R 000537-000643). 
The Court heard oral argument on this motion on February 16, 2016. 
iii. City's Motions to Strike Affidavits of Arnold and Connell 
On January 1 2016, in conjunction with its opposition to Boise Hollow's MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, the City filed MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA W. 
ARNOLD (R. 000370-000374). Boise Hollow filed PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA w. ARNOLD (R 000421-000429) on February 2. The City filed 
its REPLY BRIEF REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA W 
ARNOLD (R. 000655-000658) on February 17. 
On February 9, 2016, the City filed its MOTION TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVIT OF COLIN 
CONNELL (R. 000644-000648). Boise Hollow filed PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
STRIKE AFFIDAVIT OF COLIN CONNELL (R 000649-000654) on February 15. 
APPELLANT'S 
Oral Argument on Cross-Motions 
related Motions to Strike 
on the cross-motions 
motions to strike, on February 16,201 
Judgment, and 
summary 
3. Judge Medema's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Trial Court issued its MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ," R. 000680-000697) on April 1, 2016. 
Boise Hollow summarizes the essential findings of fact and conclusions of law which form the 
basis of Judge Medema' s judgment in favor of the City as follows: 
• The Permanent Easement Agreement did not successfully convey a permanent 
easement across Lot 1, Block 2 of the Nibler Subdivision in favor of Lot 4, Block 
2. As a matter of law, the Permanent Easement Agreement could not convey an 
easement permanently burdening the title of Lot 1 because held only a 
leasehold interest. See R. 000688-000690. 
• The interest conveyed by the grantor under the Permanent Easement Agreement 
was extinguished when the grantor transferred its interest in the leasehold to 
another tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007. See R. 000694. 
4. Jedge Medema's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PARTIES' 
VARIOUS MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Concurrent to Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ, THE TRIAL COURT also entered its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: PARTIES' VARIOUS MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
(Memorandum Decision Re: Motions to Strike, R. 000674-000679). Thereby, Judge Medema 




"The Court admits the assertions contained in the last full paragraph on page 2 of 
the affidavit of Rebecca Arnold, wherein Ms. Arnold asserts that, as Vancroft's 
attorney, she personally drafted the Permanent Easement Agreement and that a 
true and accurate copy of the Agreement is attached to her affidavit. The Court 
admits the copy of the Agreement attached to her affidavit. The Court excludes 
the remainder of the affidavit as irrelevant." 
R. 000675-000676. 
ii. Connell Aff. and Second Sanderson Deel. 
On the basis that the Permanent Easement Agreement is unambiguous and testimony 
pertaining to the parties' intent is not relevant, the District Court excluded all portions of the 
Connell Aff. and Second Sanderson Deel. R. 000675. 
5. Entry of Final Judgment and Amended Judgment 
Final judgment in compliance with IRCP 54(a) was entered on June 7, 2016, when the 
Trial Court entered its AMENDED JUDGMENT (R. 000714). Boise Hollow appeals therefrom. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1. Summary History of the Land 
Boise the set the 
Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ at R. 000682-000684: 
In 1943 Victor Nibler purchased land in what is now northwest Boise, Idaho.4 See R. 
000543-000544. This land includes both parcels at issue in this case: "Lot 1" the parcel owned 
by the City, and "Lot 4" the parcel owned by Boise Hollow. 5 
In the 1970s Victor and Ruth Nibler (the "Niblers") constructed a golf course on portions 
of their land. Lot I is located within the golf course. In 1980, the Niblers leased the golf course, 
including Lot 1 to a group of individuals for a period of 99 years. See R. 000546-0005 5 50. 
In 1986, the leasehold was assigned to Tee, Ltd. ("Tee"), whose principals included 
Tommy and Roxanne Sanderson (the "Sandersons"). See R. 000566-000574. 
In 1990, the Niblers sold much of their land, including Lot 1 and Lot 4, to Vancroft 
Corporation ("V ancroft"). See R. 000576-000584. The Niblers also assigned their interest as 
landlords of the golf course, including Lot 1, leasehold to V ancroft. See R. 000586-000591. 
On September 14, 1991 Vancroft, Tee, and the Sandersons executed the Permanent 
4 Nibler purchased (1) the Northeast of the Northeast the West of the Northeast the Southwest and the 
West 1/i of the Southeast 1/i of Section 21, Township 4 North, Range 2 East, Boise Meridia.11; and (2) the Northwest 
Y4 and the Northwest Y4 of the Northeast Y4 of Section 28 in Township 4 North, Range 2 East from the Boise 
Meridian. 
5 "Lot 4" was commonly described by the parties in their briefing to the Trial Court as the "Development Parcel." 
For the sake of uniformity, Boise Hollow herein adopts the term "Lot 4" which was employed by Judge Medema in 
his Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ. 
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In 1 a ,vith the 
County Office (R. 000182-000184). On the plat, the golf course was designated 
as being Lots 2 and 6 in Block 1 and Lot l in Block 2 ( a.k.a. "Lot 1 Nibler subdivision. 
See id The portion of Vancroft's land that was not subject to the leasehold held by Tee was 
designated as Lot 4 of Block 2 of the Nibler subdivision (a.k.a. "Lot 4"). See id. 
The crux of the parties' dispute in this matter is [l] whether the Permanent Easement 
Agreement created an easement over Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 4, and [2] if that easement can 
be expanded to meet the requirements of ACHD for the purpose of dedication and use as a public 
street. The terms of the Permanent Easement Agreement are discussed in depth later below. 
In 1993, Ltd. assigned its interest in the leasehold the golf course, including Lot 1, 
to a Mr. David Hendrickson. See R. 000593-000594. 
In October of 1993, Vancroft transferred title in Lot 4 to Bedard & Musser. See R. 
000598-000599. Vancroft likewise assigned its interest in the Permanent Easement Agreement 
to Bedard & Musser. See R. 000625-000643. 
In 1999, Vancroft sold the golf course, including Lot 1, to BlueGrass, LLC. See R. 
000601. 
In 2007, Bluegrass, LLC and David Hendrickson terminated the lease. See R. 000603-




In 201 Bedard & Musser conveyed Lot 4 to Boise Hollow, See R. 
000623. Concurrently, Bedard & Musser assigned its interest in the Permanent Easement 
Agreement to Boise Hollow. See R 000105-000107. 
2. Current Status of Lot 1 and Lot 4 
Boise Hollow holds title in fee simple to Lot 4 pursuant to that Quitclaim Deed dated 
June 26, 2015, and recorded with the Ada County Recorder on July 13, 2015, as Instrument No. 
2016-062695. See R. 000622-000623. 
The City holds a conditional possessory interest in Lot 1 pursuant to that certain Deed of 
Gift dated November 1, 201 and recorded with the Ada County Recorder on December 4, 
2014, as Instrument No. 113130306. See R. 000613-000620. 
3. Platting the Nibler Subdivision 
When the Niblers deeded a portion of the golf course property to Vancroft in 1990, they 
inadvertently violated the City's then-existing subdivision ordinances by illegally dividing the 
land. This prompted the Niblers, Sandersons, and Vancroft (collectively, the "Developers") to 
begin the process of preparing and filing a subdivision plat designated as the Nibler Subdivision 
parcels in order to properly subdivide the several segregations of land, comply with the City's 
subdivision ordinances, and legally prepare the land adjacent to the golf course for future 
development. This process, of course, necessarily involved a lengthy series of preliminary 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
the Nibler Subdivision. 0001 
platting 
BEI drafted the preliminary and final Subdivision 
plats and worked closely with the City of Boise and ACHD during the plat review, revision, and 
approval process. Id 6 
During the plat review and approval process, the City required that BEI and the 
Developers make certain revisions to the preliminary plat before the City would approve it to 
become the final plat. R. 000173. The City was aware that the Nibler Subdivision, and its 
parcels, might one day be developed into multi-residential subdivision(s) which would require 
vehicular access to the adjacent public roadways. Id Accordingly, the City specifically required 
that the Developers include a notation on the plat to clarify that ACHD has jurisdiction and 
authority over any roads or applications to construct roads which would give the Nibler 
Subdivision direct vehicular access to North 36th Street, which is the main public road adjacent 
to the Nibler Subdivision and the Quail Hollow Golf Course. Id 
The City's requirement that access to 36th Street be subject to ACHD's jurisdiction and 
approval was communicated to the Developers by way of a letter from the City dated June 22, 
1990. See Briggs Aff., EXHIBIT "A" (R. 000177-000180). At Paragraph 15 (the final paragraph 
6 The testimony set forth in the Briggs Aff. is wholly uncontradicted. Moreover, the City has not challenged the 
admissibility of any portion of the Briggs Aff., nor did the District Court strike any portion thereof. 
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access shall be allowed to 
approved by Ada County Highway District. 
R. 000179 ( emphasis added). 
unless otherwise 
Per the City's instructions, BEI and the Developers revised the preliminary plat so that 
the final plat does reflect the City's requirement that access to 36th Street be subject to ACHD's 
jurisdiction, control, and approval. The final Nibler Subdivision plat was executed and recorded 
on January 29, 1991 as Instrument No. 9205592. See Briggs Aff., EXHIBIT "B'' (R. 000181-
000184). 
Note of the final plat contains the City's required notation: 
5. Restricted Access: Except for Lots 3 and 4, Block 1, and Lots 2 and 3, 
Block no lots in this subdivision shall be provided with a primary access to N. 
36th Way, unless said primary access is specifically approved by the Ada 
County Highway District. 
R. 000182 ( emphasis added). This required note on the final plat confirms not only that the City 
was aware that the easement road might be expanded to meet ACHD's specifications, but that 
the City expressly required that the authority to approve or deny the landowner's application to 
do so be vested in ACHD. 
4. The Permanent Easement Agreement 
After finalizing the Nibler Subdivision plat, V ancroft and Tee/the Sandersons 
(collectively, Tee) negotiated the Permanent Easement Agreement to secure for Vancroft a 
vehicular access easement across the Golf Course to North 36th Street for the benefit of Lot 4. In 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF l -
0001 Specifically, the parties requested that BEI the then-existing 
road width requirements for both private and public roads. It was communicated to BEI that 
the parties intended that the easement road would initially be a limited width sufficient to 
satisfy the then-existing requirements of a private road, and that the road would be expanded to 
meet ACHD's requirements if it was later converted to public road and dedicated to ACHD. Id. 
Accordingly, BEI advised Vancroft and the Tee that an easement width of 40' would satisfy the 
then-existing requirements for a private road. R. 000175. BEI further advised that ACHD would 
require a width in excess of that amount when the road was converted to a public road. Id. 
Accordingly, the Permanent Easement Agreement describes the initial width of the 
easement as being 40 feet wide. See Permanent Easement Agreement at 1 (R. 000160), 
numbered-paragraph "l ". However, the Permanent Easement Agreement, being in harmony 
with City's requirements for the Nibler Subdivision plat, later provides that the size of the 
easement road may be expanded to meet ACHD requirements for a public road: 
6. Upon the completion of the construction of the roadway, Grantee shall 
have the right to dedicate said road to the Ada County Highway District or such 
other governmental agency then having jurisdiction and control over public roads 
and highways in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. Such road shall meet all then 
existing ordinances and requirements, including the construction of roads, 
curbs, sidewalks, bonding, etc. Upon such dedication, Grantee shall have no 
further obligations hereunder, except for the obligation of this Agreement not 
assumed by governmental agency. 
Permanent Easement Agreement at 3 (R. 000162), numbered-paragraph "6" (emphasis added). 
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terms facts: 
• The primary purpose of the Permanent Agreement was to secure for 
Vancroft a perpetual access easement across Lot 1 for the benefit of Lot 4. R. 000136. 
• At the time that the Permanent Easement Agreement was drafted, it was agreed 
that the easement road would be 40 feet in width, which would be temporarily sufficient 
as a private road until Vancroft (or its successor-in-interest) was ready to develop the Lot 
4 into a multi-lot residential subdivision. Id. 
• When the parties executed the Permanent Easement Agreement, Tee understood 
that Vancroft intended to develop the Development Parcel into a multi-lot residential 
subdivision. Therefore it was contemplated and agreed by Vancroft and Tee that the 
easement road would eventually be dedicated to ACHD as a public road, and the 
easement area would be expanded to comply with whatever ACHD's requirements for a 
public road would be at the time of the dedication. The purpose of numbered-paragraph 
"6" of the Permanent Easement Agreement was to ensure that the owner of the 
Development Parcel would have the right to expand the easement road accordingly. R. 
000136-0001 
• The anticipated dedication is expressly acknowledged in numbered-paragraph "2" 
of the Permanent Easement Agreement: 
BRIEF 
or 
the easement area, including, but not limited 
engineering, surveying, construction, and dedication, it being 
understood that the easement area is the benefit of the Grantee and the 
owners, occupants and users of Lot 4, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision. All 
utilities shall be located in the easement area. 
R. 000136. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in determining that the 
Permanent Easement Agreement did not convey a permanent easement across Lot 1 in favor of 
Lot 4, which Boise Hollow may now expand to meet ACHD's requirements. The following 
issues are necessarily incidental to the primary question: 
(1) Could as leasehold tenants of Lot 1, convey a permanent easement to 
Vancroft, fee simple owner of Lot 1? 
(2) Was the interest conveyed by Tee under the Permanent Easement Agreement 
extinguished when the grantor transferred its interest in the leasehold to another 
tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007? 
(3) Does Boise Hollow have the right under the plain language of the Permanent 
Easement Agreement to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and 
requirements, and then dedicate the road to ACHD? 
(4) Was the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement ambiguous? 
(5) If the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous, did the 
District Court err in striking or partially striking and excluding from its 
consideration the Arnold Aff, the Connell Aff., and the Second Sanderson Deel.? 
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and V. 
Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 303 P.3d l 1, 1233 (2013). This Court applies a de novo standard to 
legal questions and a clear error standard to findings of fact Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 
679, 201 P.3d 647, 652 (2009). When reviewing a trial court's conclusions oflaw, "this Court is 
not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own conclusions from the 
facts presented." Steuerer v. Richards, 155 Idaho 280, 311 PJd 292, 294 (2013). This Court 
may set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they found to be clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); 
Kennedy v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 440,442,259 P.3d 586,588 (2011). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A Tee effectively conveyed a permanent easement to Vancroft because [l] Vancroft, as fee 
title owner Lot 1, consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and [2] 
V ancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to Lot 1 and Lot 
4. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the termination of the 
lease because at no point has there been concurrence of the common law unities. 
B. The City should be estopped from denying the existence of the easement because when it 
accepted the Deed of Gift it assumed and became bound to the known obligations and 
duties appurtenant to Lot I, including the easement and the Permanent Easement 
Agreement 
C. The plain language of the Permanent Easement Agreement provides Boise Hollow the 
right to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and requirements. 
D. If the Court finds that the language of the Permanent Easement Agreement was 
ambiguous, [1] the parol evidence establishes that the parties intended for the grantee and 
its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's specifications and 
requirements, and [2] the District Court erred by striking the Arnold Aff., Connell Aff., 
and Second Sanderson Deel. 
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"'H'o .. ic1"'"''1" "'""'""'"''" .... a permanent easement to Vancroft because [1] Vancroft, as 
fee title owner Lot 1, consented to its being subject to a permanent easement, and [2] 
Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to Lot 1 
and Lot 4. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the 
termination of the lease because at no point has there been concurrence of the 
common law unities. 
The District Court based its holding primarily on two conclusions: first that Tee, being 
merely a lessee, was unable to encumber Lot 1 with a permanent easement; and second, that 
V ancroft, being the owner of Lot 1, could not have an easement over it Boise Hollow concedes 
that typically, a lessee cannot burden its leasehold with an easement which outlasts the leasehold, 
and, typically, an owner cannot grant an easement to itself. However, the circumstances at work 
in this instance were not typical. Blind application of the foregoing rules under circumstances 
such as these does disservice to the rationales underlying the rules. 
Agreement plainly states that parties' intent was to 
create a "permanent" and "perpetual" "easement" for the benefit of the dominant parcel. 7 The 
following verbiage appears on page 1 of the Permanent Easement Agreement: 
V ancroft has requested Tee, Ltd. to grant it an easement across the southwest 
portion of Lot 1, Block 2, Nibler Subdivision, to provide access and utilities to 
Lot 4, Block 2, of the subdivision, and Tee, Ltd. is willing to grant the easement 
R. 000160 ( emphasis added). 
7 Based on the District Court's interpretation of Idaho law concerning the creation of easements, the District Court 
concluded that the parties to the Easement Agreement intended not to create an easement, but rather to create a 
license. See R. 000693. However, the plain language of the Easement Agreement very clearly and expressly states 
the parties' intent to create a permanent and perpetual easement rather than a temporary license. See R. 000160-
000162. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF • 16 -
R 000160-000161 (emphasis added). See Paragraphs 2, 3, 5 Permanent 
Easement Agreement referencing the "easement area. Id. at 000161-000162. Surely the parties 
would not have contemplated the building of a road and its dedication to ACHD if the right were 
meant to be temporary. See Paragraph 6 of Permanent Easement Agreement (R 000162). 
The intent of Tee and Vancroft is self-evident from the language of the Permanent 
Easement Agreement The Court's primary objective when interpreting a contract is to discover 
the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract is made. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 
69, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007). "Indeed, the cardinal principle of contract interpretation is that the 
intention of the parties must prevail unless it is inconsistent with some established rule of law." 
11 Williston on Contracts § (4th ed.). 
In light of the parties' clear intent, the question is whether they were legally capable of 
accomplishing their mutual goal of burdening Lot l with a permanent access and utility easement 
for the benefit of Lot 4. To answer this question, the Court should seek to reconcile the plainly-
stated intent of Tee and V ancroft with the applicable rules of law and the rationales underlying 
those rules. In doing so, the Court should conclude that Tee effectively conveyed a permanent 
easement to Vancroft because [ 1] V ancroft, as fee title owner Lot 1, consented to its being 
subject to a permanent easement, and [2] Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and 





tenant, the District Court relied upon 
1 because it was merely a 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 12 which states 
that "[a]n easement can be created only by a person who has title to or an estate in the servient 
tenement, and an easement may not create a right that the grantor did not possess."8 However, 
while a lessee cannot grant a right in the servient parcel that it does not possess, the inverse is 
certainly also be true: a lessee can grant a right in the servient parcel which it does possess. 
Boise Hollow's position is equally simple: Tee had the right and authority to create the intended 
permanent easement across Lot 1 because Vancroft granted Tee the right to do so. 
"[A] leasehold is an estate in real property." Coppedge v. 71 Idaho 248, I, 229 
P.2d 977, 979 95 years," as opposed to a 
"freehold estate." See Tobias v. State Tax Comm 'n, 85 Idaho 250, 256, 378 P.2d 628, 631 
(1963). The holder of such estate has a possessory right the land. A lessee has a possessory 
interest in the land, while the lessor retains a reversionary interest. Wing v. Martin, I 07 Idaho 
267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (1984). 
"Any person with a possessory interest in land may create an easement burdening that 
person's interest." The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land, Persons who may create 
8 Boise Hollow is unaware of any Idaho authority bearing upon the right of a tenant to encumber the leasehold 
property with an easement. Neither the City nor the District Court cited any during the proceedings below. 
Accordingly, this may be an issue of first impression in Idaho. 
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Bingham , 93 630 (1970) ("It is 
recognized that in the instant case the appellant under the terms of the lease has practically all of 
the rights in and to the warehouse normally considered as incident to ownership of the property-
use of the property, right to encumber it, the right to transfer it (subject to approval), the right to 
improve, alter and change it; ... "); see also Restatement of Property§ 124 (1942); see also e.g., 
Isely v. City of Wichita, 38 Kan. App. 2d 1022, 1024, 174 P.3d 919,921 (2008); Martin v. Sun 
Pipe Line Co., 542 Pa. 281, 285-287, 666 A.2d 637, 639-640 (1995). 
Generally, a leaseholder generally has no power to permanently burden the reversion. 
The Law of Easements & Licenses in Land § 3 Therefore an easement granted by a tenant 
does not last beyond the interest that the grantor held in the servient tenement Id In other 
words, a tenant-granted easement terminates with the tenancy. The policy underlying this rule 
of course, to protect the owner of the servient estate from being bound by an encumbrance 
granted unilaterally by his tenant without the owner's approval. See Leichtfuss v. Dabney, 329 
Mont 129, 122 P.3d 1220 (Montana 2005) (citing Rest3d § 4.3 cmt. e, at 526). 
The policy discouraging a tenant from permanently burdening the fee is not implicated 
where the party by the indeed who the is also the owner 
of the servient parcel. In such case, the holder of the reversion has granted the leaseholder the 
power to burden the freehold estate. Therefore, it follows that where, as here, the easement is 
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rigid a that 
an easement from running to a remainderman or reversioner is unsound" where the easement 
benefited reversion, consistent with parties' expectations. Id at 141-45, 122 P.3d at 1229-1 
In Leichtfuss, the question was whether an easement could persist where it was the 
dominant estate, rather than the servient, which was held in less than fee simple at the time of the 
encumbrance. The Leichtfuss court's discussion of the issues is particularly instructive, as it 
discusses how the policies underlying the rule come into play where the owner of the fee is 
actually benefited rather than prejudiced by the encumbrance Gust as Vancroft was benefited 
rather than prejudiced by the easement in this case): 
. . . a number of courts have held that an easement burdening or benefitting an 
estate less than a fee simple ends when that estate expires. See Jon W. Bruce & 
James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land,§ 10:15, at 10-28 
(2001 ), and cases cited therein. As such, it may be more precise to say that an 
easement runs with the estate in land to which it is appurtenant, or that it follows 
ownership of the estate for as long as that estate exists. 
The foundation for this principle is easily understood where the servient tenement 
is held in less than fee simple: a person can convey no more or greater title than 
he holds. See Rest.3d § 4.3 cmt. e, at 526 ("The duration of a servitude is 
normally limited to the duration of the estate of the creator of the servitude 
because the creator cannot burden a greater estate than he or she has.") ( emphasis 
added). In other words, a life tenant or a lessee generally cannot impose upon his 
land a burden that passes to the remainderman or the reversioner. 
Where the dominant tenement is held in less than fee simple, however, the basis 
for the foregoing rule-which prevents the benefit of an easement from running to 
the remainderman or reversioner is less obvious. A number of courts have ruled 
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0, the owner of a fee simple in Blackacre, granted an easement to 
A, the ovvner of a 10-year lease term in Whiteacre, to use the 
driveway across Blackacre for access to Whiteacre. The deed 
states that the easement is intended to benefit the term and the 
reversion in Whiteacre. The servitude burdens the fee-simple 
estate in Blackacre and benefits both the leasehold estate and the 
reversion in Whiteacre. 
Rest.3d § 2.5 illus. 3, at 100 (emphasis added). As this illustration demonstrates, 
the termination of a dominant estate held in less than fee simple does not 
automatically extinguish an easement appurtenant thereto. Rather, it is the intent 
or expectations of the parties to the servitude which determine the duration 
thereof. 
Indeed, a careful reading of the opinions of each of the aforementioned courts 
which held that an easement granted to a life tenant or a lessee terminates with the 
life estate or lease reveals that the results in those cases were grounded, to some 
extent, on a presumption that the grantor of the easement was aware of the 
terminable nature of the grantee's estate and intended the easement to exist only 
for that limited duration, or that the life tenant or lessee did not intend to 
permanently burden the servient estate. The Third Restatement has succinctly 
described this approach in the following terms: "A servitude should be 
interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the 
language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of 
the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created." Rest.3d 
§ 4.1(1), at 496-97 (emphasis added). 
Having considered the foregoing authorities in the context of the facts of the case 
at hand, we conclude that rigid application a rule that the an 
easement from running to a remainderman or reversioner is unsound. 
Id at 142-44, 122 P.3d at 1229-31 (bold emphasis added, italic emphasis in original). 
The same concerns are at stake in the instant case as were considered by the Leichtfuss 
BR1EF 
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language used in the or 
the servitude, and to carry out the 
Id at 144, 122 P.3d at 1 l (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes§ 4.1(1)). 
The foregoing discussion is particularly applicable in this case. Montana Supreme 
Court essentially asked one question: Could the parties manifest intent be given effect without 
running afoul of the applicable rules of law? To answer that question, the Court analyzed the 
policy underlying the rule generally prohibiting the permanence of the easement to determine if 
its application in this instance was well-served. Recognizing that the policy was for the 
protection of the fee simple owner, the Court determined that it did not make sense to prohibit 
the creation of a permanent easement where the fee simple owner would be hindered rather than 
protected. 
The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Leichtfuss likewise comports with the rule that 
an easement appurtenant becomes "fixed as an appurtenance to the real property" and "[serve] 
the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the land." 
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 (2003). As an easement appurtenant 
follows the land which it benefits, it cannot be unilaterally terminated by an act of the owner of 
the servient estate. See 80 AL.R.2d 743; Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.8 
(2000); Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876 (2008); Slauson v. Marozzo Plumbing & 
Heating, LLC, Mont 75, 82, 219 P.3d 509, 515 (Montana 2009) (termination of lease did 
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this case, as in Leichtfuss, this Court must both at the manifest intent of the 
contracting parties and determine whether any rationale or policy is actually served by 
prohibiting the imposition of a permanent easement under these particular circumstances. As in 
Leichtfuss, doing so would hinder rather than protect the simple owner (Vancroft) and its 
successors-in-interest. Accordingly, prohibiting the permanent easement would disserve the 
underlying policy that the fee simple owner should not be harmed by an easement To the 
contrary, in this case it is the prohibition of the easement that would harm the owner. 
2. There are no grounds to prohibit a landowner from consenting to the 
creation of an easement across land owned but never possessed. In this case, 
Vancroft never held concurrent unity of possession and title with respect to 
Lot 1 and Lot 4 because Lot 1 was subject to a 99-year lease when Vancroft 
took ownership. 
Superficially, Boise Hollow's position would seem to run counter to the rule that a 
landowner cannot create an easement in his own land. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. 
Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,420,283 P.3d 728, 737 (2012). However, it would not be appropriate 
to apply that rule under these circumstances because at the time of the agreement V ancroft did 
not have possession of Lot 1 and was very unlikely to obtain possession of Lot 1 prior to 
divesting itself of both Lot I and Lot 4. Neither Vancroft, nor any of its successors-in-interest, 
ever had concurrent title and possession of Lot 1 and Lot 
The rule that "one cannot have an easement in his own lands" was first set forth in Idaho 
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necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment either parcel: 
True, an easement is defined as a right in the lands of another, and therefore one 
cannot have an easement in his own lands (19 C. J: p. 863), but, where the owner 
of an entire tract employs a part thereof so that he "derives from the other a 
benefit or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one in 
favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement exists, such 
easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, 
will pass to the grantee by implication." 19 C. J. p. 914. See, also, 1 Thompson on 
Real Property, § 352; 9 R. C. L. p. 755, § 22; German Savings & Loan Society v. 
Gordon, 54 Or. 147, 102 P. 736, 26 L. RA. (N. S.) 33 L 
Id. at 376, 288 P. at 429. 
Moreover, the rule preventing a landowner from having an easement in his own land is 
ostensibly based in the doctrine of merger. The doctrine of merger operates to extinguish an 
easement when the dominant and servient parcels come under common ownership and 
possession. See, e.g., Davis v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d 403, 406 (1961). However, 
operation of the doctrine of merger requires unity of both ownership and possession. Since 
Vancroft never had possession of the servient parcel, the doctrine of merger does not apply. 
"For an easement to be extinguished under the doctrine of merger, there must 
be unity of title, and, according to some authorities, of possession and enjoyment of the dominant 
and servient estates." 28A Corpus Juris Secundum, Easements § 143, Unity of title (2016) 
(emphasis added). "The ownership of the two estates must be coextensive and equal in validity, 
quality, and all other circumstances ofright. Accordingly, an easement is not extinguished under 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Idaho, law title, 
possession. Ogilvie v. Idaho Bank & , 99 Idaho 361, 366, 582 215, 220 (1978) 
(emphasis added); see also Afatter of Estate of Ashe, 114 Idaho 70, 75, P.2d 281, 286 (Ct. 
App. 1988) aff'd, 117 Idaho 266, 787 P .2d 252 (1990) (reciting common unities, including 
title and possession); see also Guy v. State, 438 A2d 1250, 1253 (DeL Super. Ct. 1981) ("The 
doctrine of merger does not operate where the fee in the servient estate is subject to an 
outstanding estate in possession."). Of course, unity of possession would destroy an easement. 
See Wilton v. Smith, 40 Idaho 81, 1 P. 704, 705 (1924) (quoting Quinlan v. Noble, 75 Cal. 250, 
17 P. 69 (1888) ("No easement exists so long as the unity of possession remains ... ")). 
The binding authority discussing the doctrine of merger pertains to the scenario where an 
existing easement is extinguished because the dominant and servient parcels become united in 
interest, title, time, and possession. However, the rationale underlying the doctrine of merger 
functions both forwards and backwards. In other words: just as the concurrence of the unities is 
required to extinguish an easement, the absence of such concurrence functions to preserve an 
easement. Accordingly, an easement may be created over one parcel for the benefit of another, 
despite common ownership of both parcels, where unity is broken as regards interest, time, and, 
most significantly, possession. Such was the case at the time that Vancroft and Tee entered into 
the Permanent Easement Agreement. 
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Throughout the foregoing transfers, the dominant and servient never 
owned and possessed by the same party at the same time. Accordingly, creation of the 
easement was not prevented by concurrence in the common law unities. 
3. The permanent easement was not subsequently extinguished by the 
termination of the lease because of the doctrine of merger. At no point has 
there been concurrence of the common law unities. 
For the same reason that the easement was not prevented, nor has it been extinguished. 
The District Court concluded that the interest taken by Vancroft under the Permanent Easement 
Agreement would have been extinguished when Tee transferred its interest in the leasehold to 
another tenant in 1993, or upon termination of the lease in 2007. See R. 000694. However, this 
9 In fact, at no time during its ownership was Van croft ever entitled to have possession of Lot I due to the 99-year 
leasehold. As of the date of the Permanent Easement Agreement, Vancroft owned both Lot I and Lot 4, but Tee 
held possession of Lot I. Vancroft assigned Lot 4 to Plaintiff Bedard & Musser in 1993 pursuant to that certain 
CORPORA TE WARRANTY DEED dated October 19, 1993, executed by Van croft Corporation, and recorded on 
November 3, 1993, as Ada County Instrument No. 9392443. See R. 000598-000599. Tee maintained possession of 
Lot 1. Tee assigned its leasehold interest in Lot I to David Hendrickson in 1993 pursuant to that certain 
ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF GOLF COURSE LEASE dated June 30, 1993, executed by Tee, Ltd., and recorded 
on June 30, 1993, as Ada County Instrument No. 9351843. See R 000593-000594. Vancroft assigned its 
ownership of Lot l to Bluegrass, LLC in 1999 pursuant to that certain CORPORA TE WARRANTY DEED dated March 
29, 1999, executed by Vancroft Corporation, and recorded on March 30, 1999, as Ada County Instrument No. 
99030645. See R. 000601. Bluegrass, LLC and Hendrickson agreed to the termination of the leasehold interest in 
2007 pursuant to that certain TERMINATION OF LEASE dated October 4, 2007, executed by Bluegrass, LLC, and 
David Hendrickson, and recorded on October 4, 2007, as Ada County Instrument No. 107138040. See R. 000603-
0005605. Lot I was conveyed to Quail Hollow, LLC, in 2007 pursuant to that certain WARRANTY DEED dated 
October 4, 2007, executed by Bluegrass, LLC in favor of Quail Hollow, LLC, and recorded on October 4, 2007, as 
Ada County Instrument No. 107138039. See R. 000607-00061 L Plaintiff Bedard & Musser maintained ownership 
of Lot 4 until assigning it to Plaintiff Boise Hollow Land Holdings, RLLP in 2015 pursuant to that certain 
QUITCLAIM DEED dated June 26, 2015, executed by Bedard & Musser in favor of Boise Hollow Land Holdings, 
RLLP, and recorded on July 13, 2015, as Ada County Instrument No. 2015-062695. See R. 000105-000107. 
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set 
create a permanent access easement across 
1 for the benefit 4. 
Just as the mechanics of the doctrine of merger permitted the creation the easement, so 
too did those mechanics prevent extinguishment of the easement when assigned the lease in 
1993, or when the lease ended in 2007. Neither of those events resulted in concurrence in the 
common law unities. Moreover, upon creation the easement became "fixed as an appurtenance 
to the [ servient estate]" and "serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that cannot be 
separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 230, 76 P.3d 969, 974 
(2003). As an easement appurtenant follows the land which it benefits, it cannot be unilaterally 
terminated by an act of the owner of the servient estate. See 80 A.L.R2d 743· Restatement 
(Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.8 (2000). Thus, neither Tee nor any of its successors had the 
right to terminate the easement by any unilaterally action such as terminating the lease. 
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should be easement 
it accepted the Deed it assumed to the known 
obligations and duties appurtenant to Lot 1, including the easement and the 
Permanent Easement Agreement. 
When the City acquired Lot 1, it did so with full knowledge of the encumbrance placed 
upon the land by the Permanent Easement Agreement and the specific terms of the thereof. See 
R 000618. The City is bound by those terms not only because they run with the land as 
described hereinabove, but also because the City contractuaUy subscribed to them. 
Where one accepts a deed of real property, one assumes and becomes bound to the 
kno\vn obligations and duties appurtenant thereto. See Lane v. Pac. & IN Ry. Co., 8 Idaho 230, 
67 P. 656, 658 (1902). Covenants, agreements and restrictions relating to the real property are 
valid and enforceable. See Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV, Inc., 151 Idaho 242,246,254 P.3d 
1238, 1242 (2011). Those Courts that have specifically considered the issue of the contractual 
nature of covenants have ruled that recorded covenants and declarations are contractual nature 
because the acceptance of the terms of the covenants and chain of title agreements results from 
an O\vner voluntarily taking title to the property as part of a sale and thereby impliedly agrees 
and consents to the obligations contained in those recorded covenants and conditions. See, e.g., 
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal. 4th 223,237, 282 P.3d 
121 1225 (2012). Thus, the recorded agreement and covenants therein become the rights and 
responsibilities of contracting parties determined by the terms of their recorded contract. 
Frances T v. Vill. Green Owners Assn., 42 CaL 3d 490,512, 723 P.2d 573 (1986). 
Idaho law bearing on equitable servitudes is also instructive. An equitable servitude 
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at 
185 (2007) Covenants, § 1 (an equitable servitude arises 
"by implication from the language of the deeds or the conduct of the parties. It concerns a 
promise of the landowner to refrain from using his land in a certain way. See, e.g., Idaho Power 
v. State, By & Through Dep't of Water Res., 104 Idaho 575,587,661 P.2d 741, 753 (1983) 
("restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes" relate to "[a]greements not to assert ownership 
rights"). An equitable servitude is therefore restrictive in character. St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 
Idaho 702, 703 n.l, 769 P.2d 579, 580 n.1 (1989). This Court held in W Wood Investments, 
supraruled as follows: 
Whether a successor in interest takes the interest subject to the equitable servitude 
is a question of notice. Streets, 898 P.2d at 379-81 (Wyo. 1995). Whether a party 
has notice of an issue or event is a question of fact See, e.g, Taylor v. Soran 
Restaurant, Inc. 131 Idaho 525, 960 P.2d 1254 (1998) (Whether notice of injury 
subject to workers' compensation claim was given to employer was question of 
fact) 
141 Idaho at 85, 106 P.3d at 106. 
A purchaser is charged with every fact shown by the records and is presumed to 
know every other fact which an examination suggested by the records would have 
disclosed. Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195-96, 30 P.3d 970, 973-74 
(2001) (citing Cordova v. Hood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 1, 21 L.Ed. 587 (1872); 
Northwestern Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 19 S.Ct 36, 43 L.Ed. 307 (1898)). 
"This Court has stated: 'One who purchases or encumbrances with notice of 
inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one who fails to investigate 
the open and obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in good faith.' " Middlekauff 
II, 110 Idaho at 916, 719 P.2d at 1176 (quoting Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 
218,220,526 P.2d 178, 180 (1974)). 
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of Lot 4 because the City had notice of the physical and legal existence to the easement 
road prior to acquiring Lot 1. See 1U.iddlekaujf v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 654 P.2d 
13 85 ( 1982) ("Middlekauff I"); ,'vfiddlekaujf v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 Idaho 909, 719 P .2d 1169 
(1986) ("Middlekauff If'); W Wood Investments, supra; Ute Park Summer Home Association v. 
Maxwell Land Grant Co., 77 N.M. 730, 427 P.2d 249 (Ct.App.1967), affd, 83 N.M. 558, 494 
P.2d 971 (1972). In any event, so strong is the binding nature of the recorded instrument on 
grantees in the chain of title that even if the instrument is misfiled by the county recorder, it is 
still binding on the grantees. See lvfiller v. Simonson, 140 Idaho 287, 291, 92 P3d 537, 541 
(2004). 
In this case, the City took ownership of Lot 1 with knowledge of the existence of the 
easement and with the understanding that the easement and the Permanent Easement Agreement 
were both valid and enforceable. Further, the City contractually agreed to comply with the terms 
of the Permanent Easement Agreement See R. 000460 (DONATION AGREEMENT between the 
City and Quail Hollow, LLC, incorporating DEED OF GIFT as Exhibit "A" thereto); see also R. 
000618, 113 (referencing Permanent Easement Agreement). 
Accordingly, when the City took ownership of the Golf Course, it expressly accepted the 
easement and assumed all rights and obligations under the Permanent Easement Agreement and 
it should be estopped from denying the existence of the easement in this case. 
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Easement 
to meet ACHD's specifications and 
the Permanent Easement Agreement is that 
Vancroft: and Tee intended for Vancroft: to have a 40 foot-wide private road easement until such 
time as Vancroft: or its successor chose to develop Lot 4, at which point the road would be 
expanded to meet ACHD's requirements. 
The dispute between Boise Hoilow and the City with regard to the meaning of the 
Permanent Easement Agreement comes down to a difference in interpretation. "The 
interpretation of a contract begins with the language of the contract itself." Cristo Viene 
Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007) (quoting 
Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla Mining Co., 143 Idaho 22, 26, 137 P.3d 409, 413 
(2006)). "If a contract's language is unambiguous, 'then its meaning and legal effect must be 
determined from its words."' Boise Mode, v. Donahoe Pace & Partners Ltd, 154 Idaho 99, 
108, 294 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2013) (quoting Cristo Viene, 144 304 at 308, 160 P.3d at 747). "The 
Court's 'primary objective when interpreting a contract is to discover the mutual intent of the 
parties at the time the contract is made. If possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained 
from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their intent."' Guzman v. Piercy, 
155 Idaho 928, 936, 318 P.3d 918, 926 (2014) (quoting Straub, supra). 
Two clauses of a contract related to the same thing must be "read together and 
harmonized" unless they are "so repugnant that they cannot stand together." See Morgan v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 518, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948). Furthermore, "an 
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contract. ' 1 
997). "Apparently conflicting provisions must be reconciled so as to meaning to both, 
rather than nullifying any contractual provision, reconciliation can be effected by any 
reasonable interpretation of the entire instrument Madrid v. Roth, 134 Idaho 802, 806, 10 P .3d 
751, 755 (Ct App. 2000) (quoting 17A Corpus Juris Secundum, Contracts§ 324 (1999)). In 
other words, "[t]erms of a written instrument should be construed in pari materia and a 
construction adopted that gives effect to all terms used. Inconsistent parts in a contract are to be 
reconciled, if susceptible of reconciliation .... " Advance Tank & Const. Co. v. Gulf Coast Asphalt 
Co., 968 So. 2d 520, 526 (Ala. 2006). 
The dispute in this case is a result of Permanent Easement Agreement containing two 
separate descriptions of the easement area: numbered-paragraph 1 of the Permanent Easement 
Agreement states that the width of the easement road is 40 feet, while numbered-paragraph 6 
explains that in the event the owner dedicates the road to ACHD, the width of the easement road 
shall meet ACHD's requirements for a public road. As described above, these provisions can be 
read together and a common-sense reading of these provisions does not reveal a conflict. Thus, 
there are few similar controversies which have reached the appellate level in any jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the case law that is reasonably on point confirms the judicial policy 
harmonizing supposedly "conflicting" provisions wherever possible. 
For example, in Thornton v. Hamilton, 32 Idaho 304, 181 P. 700 (1919), a contract for 
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the thereof as specified above. A separate 
to 
required the lessee, 
at the expiration or termination of the lease, to "restore the said personal property to the said 
lessor in like good condition in which it now is, wear and diminution resulting from reasonable 
use thereof excepted." Id. The lessor contended that these provisions were inconsistent, which 
contention was rejected outright by the Idaho Supreme Court: "The provisions of the contract are 
not inconsistent, and the intention of the parties that appellants should be insurers of the horses 
while in their possession is entirely clear from the language employed." Id. 
The 2002 Fifth Circuit case of Pers. Sec. & Safety Sys. Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 297 F.3d 
388 (5th Cir. 2002) is perhaps more instructive. In that case, the court was called upon to 
determine whether a forum-selection clause in a stock-purchase agreement conflicted with an 
arbitration agreement contained in a licensing agreement that was executed alongside the stock-
purchase agreement. The forum-selection clause stated: "Governing law. This agreement shall 
be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. Any suit or 
proceeding brought hereunder shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts located 
in Texas." 297 F.3d at 395 (some capitalization omitted). The plaintiff in that case, PSSI, 
argued that Llie forum-selection clause required that any dispute arising out of the stock-purchase 
agreement be litigated in Texas courts, thus expressly excluding arbitration. The court held: 
We do not find PSSI's interpretation of the forum selection clause persuasive. 
Standing alone, one could plausibly read the forum selection clause to mean that 
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we must interpret 
contractual arrangement and we must give effect to all 
arrangement. Given our conclusion that the arbitration provision in the Product 
Development Agreement applies to all claims related to the overall transaction, 
we must therefore interpret the forum selection provision in the Stock Purchase 
Agreement in a manner that is consistent with the arbitration provision. 
Reading the two provisions together, it becomes clear that the forum selection 
clause does not require the parties to litigate all claims in Texas courts, nor does it 
expressly forbid arbitration of claims arising under the Stock Purchase 
Agreement. Instead, we interpret the forum selection clause to mean that the 
parties must litigate in Texas courts only those disputes that are not subject to 
arbitration-for example, a suit to challenge the validity or application of the 
arbitration clause or an action to enforce an arbitration award. Rather than 
covering all "disputes" or all "claims" like the arbitration provision in the Product 
Development Agreement, the forum selection clause confers "exclusive 
jurisdiction" on Texas courts only with respect to "any suit or proceeding." This 
limitation suggests that the parties intended the clause to apply only in the event 
of a non-arbitrable dispute that must be litigated in court. 
Personal Security, 297 F.3d at 395-96 (footnotes and internal citations and quotations omitted) 
Turning to the clauses at issue in the Permanent Easement Agreement, numbered-
paragraphs "I" and "6" are certainly not patently inconsistent Vancroft and Tee carefully 
crafted an agreement whereby V ancroft took possession of an easement road which would be 40 
feet wide until such time as Vancroft chose to dedicate it to ACHD, at which point it would be 
expanded to meet ACHD's requirements at the time. In this way, the parties purposely drafted 
flexible language that allowed their contract to fluidly incorporate ACHD's unknown future 
specifications while also providing an ascertainable width (i.e., 40 feet) for use in the interim. In 
short, these provisions worked together, as the parties intended, to provide the parties with an 
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agreement and gives to the parties' 
The City argued below that because Paragraph 1 does not use the word "initial" and 
because Paragraph 6 does not include a word such as "expand," they cannot be interpreted so as 
to call for subsequent expansion of the easement area. Therefore, the City contends that 
Paragraph 6 "simply authorizes Boise Hollow to dedicate any potential future road ... if such 
road meets ACHD's then-current construction specification." R. 000243. 
However, the City's argument fails by its very own logic: Paragraph I does not contain 
words which express any prohibition on future enlargement. More importantly, Paragraph 6 
does not contain the word "if' or any other language suggesting a contingency which must be 
met before the road can be constructed and dedicated to ACHD. Paragraph 6 simply states that 
the "road" once constructed "shall meet all then-existing ordinances. R. 000162 ( emphasis 
added). If the parties to the Permanent Easement Agreement had desired to restrict the size of 
the roadway, regardless of ACHD requirements at the time of its construction and dedication, the 
parties could easily have drafted a provision which stated that the roadway "shall not exceed 40' 
regardless of ACHD requirements for a roadway." That is not what the parties did. The plain 
language Paragraphs 1 Paragraph 6 not employ any language which would 
render the Grantees' right to construct and dedicate the road contingent upon ACHD accepting 
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denotes a mandate. See, 
("This Court on several occasions 
discretionary. The structure 
P.2d 1003, 1006 
construed the word 'shall' as being mandatory and not 
the sentence is such that the subject ("Such road") must 
perform the verb ("shall meet") necessary to conform to the object ("all then existing ordinances 
and requirements ... "). Therefore, the state (i.e., the size) of the subject ("Such road") must 
necessarily be malleable in order to perform its directive. 
The most reasonable, logical, and plain interpretation of Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the 
Permanent Easement Agreement is Boise Hollow's: Vancroft and Tee intended for Vancroft to 
own a 40 foot-wide private road easement (being large enough to encompass the dirt road then 
existing) until such time as V ancroft chose to develop it, at which point it would be expanded to 
meet ACHD's requirements. 
10 A plain way to express such a condition would have been something to the effect of: ''If the dimensions of the 
roadway described herein are sufficient to meet all then existing ordinances and requirements, including the 
construction of roads, curbs, sidewalks, bonding, etc., then upon the completion of the construction of the roadway, 
Grantee shall have the right to dedicate said road to the Ada County Highway District or such other governmental 
agen<y then having jurisdiction and control over public roads and highways in Boise, Ada County, Idaho." 
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was 
evidence establishes that the parties intended for the 
grantee and its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's 
specifications and requirements, and [2) the District Court erred by striking the 
Arnold Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel. 
As illustrated above, the provisions of the Permanent Easement Agreement do not 
conflict and there is no ambiguity at work However, should the Court deem otherwise it will 
find that the extrinsic evidence confirms the contracting intent of V ancroft and Tee that the 
easement road should be 40 feet wide until Vancroft or its successor chose to dedicate it to 
ACHD, at which point the easement road would be naturally expanded to meet ACHD's 
requirements. 
A court may deem a contract ambiguous where it determines that the contract contains 
conflicting or inconsistent provisions. Madrid at 806, 10 P 3d at The standard for 
identifying ambiguity is a high one: "For a contract term to be ambiguous, there must be at least 
two different reasonable interpretations of the term, or it must be nonsensical." Steel Farms, Inc. 
v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 266, 297 P.3d 222, 229 (2012). "[W]here contractual 
provisions are conflicting, the interpretation of the written contract and of the intent of the parties 
is a matter for the trial judge's discretion." Haener v. Ada Cnty. Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 
173,697 P.2d 1184, 1187 (1985). 
Typically, "[t]he parol evidence rule bars the use of extrinsic evidence when a court 
interprets a written contract." AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 165, 307 
P.3d I 76, 182 (2013). "Only when a document is ambiguous is parol evidence admissible to 
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1 a 
contract, the primary goal must be to seek and give to the 
parties at the time the conveyance. See lvfarek v. Lawrence, 53 Idaho 50, 53, 278 P.3d 920, 
923 (2012) (emphasis added) ("the court's primary goal [when considering parol evidence] is to 
seek and give to the real intention of the parties, which is determined according to the 
language of the instrument and the circumstances surrounding the transaction."). See also, e.g., 
Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404-05, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217-18 (2008); Commercial 
Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 213, 177 P.3d 955, 960 
(2008) ("The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the contracting 
parties at the time the contract was entered. Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 
Idaho 866,870,876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct App. 1994); Straub, supra. 
1. The parol evidence establishes that the parties intended for the grantee and 
its successors to have the right to expand the road to meet ACHD's 
specifications and requirements. 
In this case, the most compelling evidence with respect to the intent of Tee and Vancroft 
is the sworn statement of the actual drafter of the Permanent Easement Agreement, Rebecca 
Arnold. See R. OOOI34-00017L In her affidavit, Ms. Arnold unequivocally confirms that Tee 
and Vancroft always intended that whoever owned the dominant parcel (i.e., the Development 
Parcel) would have the right to expand the easement road to meet ACHD's requirements and 
then dedicate the road to ACHD. See R. 000135-000138. It is for this reason that the Permanent 
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000172-000197), which 
confirms that the parties advised BEI that they intended that the 40' width be temporary and 
effective until such time as the owner of the Development Parcel decided to develop it. R. 
000174-000175. 
In addition, it is also uncontradicted that the City required the Developers to include 
language in the Nibler Subdivision final plat which confirmed that access to the various parcels 
of the Nibler Subdivision (including the Development Parcel) to 361h Street would be at the 
discretion and to the standards of ACHD; not the City. Not only was the City aware that access 
might be granted to 36th street, it expressly ceded authority over that issue to ACHD. R. 000173. 
Because the best extrinsic evidence available to the Court reveals that Tee and Vancroft 
so intended, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant PlaintifPs Motion and enter its judgment that 
Plaintiff has the right to dedicate the easement road to ACHD and expand the road to meet 
ACHD's requirements. 
2. If this Court finds that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous, 
then it should also find that the District Court erred by striking the Arnold 
Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel. 
Of course the majority11 of the foregoing extrinsic evidence was excluded by the District 
Court. R. 000675-000679. The basis of the District Court's exclusion was the Court's 
11 Notably, the District Court did not strike or otherwise exclude the Briggs Aff., nor did the City so request. 
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conclusion that the Permanent Easement Agreement is not ambiguous. See R.000675. 
contracting was 
not relevant. 
If, however, this Court deems that the Permanent Easement Agreement is ambiguous, 
then parol evidence pertaining to the parties' contracting intent becomes relevant. Buku 
Properties, at 834, 291 P.3d at 1033. In such case, the District Court erred by excluding the 
Arnold Aff., Connell Aff., and Second Sanderson Deel. from its consideration. 12 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, the above-named Plaintiffs-Appellants respectfully 
request that this Court reverse the District Court's ruling and instruct the District Court to enter 
its judgment in favor of Plaintiffs-Appellants as prayed for in Plaintiffs' FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2016. 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP 
~ 
By: __ ..J./.'lt!!!l.~~~~~~---· 
Terry C. 
Attom 
12 The District Court did not touch upon the Briggs Aff. in its Memorandum Decision Re: MSJ therefore it is unclear 
whether the District Court excluded it If the District Court excluded the Briggs Aff. from its consideration, it erred 
in doing so. The District Court likewise erred to the extent that it simply failed to consider the Briggs Aff. See, e.g., 
Trunnell v. Ferge!, 153 Idaho 68, 70, 278 P.3d 938, 940 (2012) (" . .it is the province of the trial court to weigh 
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses ... ") 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of October, 2016, I caused a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing document to be served upon the following individual, by the method indicated, and 
addressed as follows: 
Scott B. Muir 
Abigail R. Germaine 
Deputy City Attorneys 
Boise City Attorney's Office 
150 N. Capitol Blvd. 
P.O. Box 500 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0500 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRJEF 




File and Serve System Electronic 
